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abstraCt
The dynamics of law and economics in the cannon of American legal thought was 
initially characterized by a denial of the independence of contract law, tailored by 
judicial decisions and the realist revolution. This paper shows that this denial begets the 
rebirth of contract law based on policy doctrines that asked for the turn to economics, 
by giving a new linguistic framework and foundation to contracts. After such process, 
an inconspicuous doctrine of contract law was built by the Critical Legal Studies 
(CLS) doctrine. Its effect was not constructive but deconstructive, but purposeless and 
proposeless. After the failure of CLS, law and economics consolidated as the actual 
base of US contract law. 
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dErECho dE Los Contratos y EConomía: CiCLos y EquiLibrio  
En EL Cañón dEL pEnsamiEnto LEgaL nortEamEriCano
rEsumEn
La dinámica del análisis económico en el cañón del pensamiento legal americano se 
fundó en una negación del derecho contractual, adaptada por decisiones judiciales y 
la revolución realista. Este artículo muestra que esta negación genera un renacimiento, 
y es la política pública la que permite el giro a la economía, dando un nuevo marco 
lingüístico al derecho de los contratos. Después de tal proceso, la doctrina del los 
estudios críticos legales (CLS), desarrolló una perspectiva deconstructiva, minando 
el ciclo con observaciones sin objetivo y ni propósito. Así se consolida el análisis 
económico legal como marco lingüístico del derecho de los contratos. 
Palabras clave autor: derecho de los contratos, derecho y economía, teoría legal, 
pensamiento legal.
Palabras clave desriptor: contratos, derecho y economía, teoría del derecho.
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droit dEs Contrats Et d’éConomiE: CyCLEs Et équiLibrE  
dans La LignéE dE La pEnséE LégaLE dE L’amériquE du nord
résumé
La dynamique de l’analyse économique dans la lignée de la pensée légale américaine a 
été fondée dans une négation du droit des contrats, adaptée par des décisions judiciaires 
et la révolution réaliste. Cet article montre que cette négation produit une renaissance, 
et que c’est la politique publique qui permet le virement vers l’économie, en donnant un 
nouveau cadre linguistique au droit des contrats. Après un tel processus, la doctrine 
des études critiques légales (CLS), a développé une perspective non-constructive, en 
minant le cycle avec des observations sans objectif et sans but. On consolide ainsi 
l’analyse économique légale en tant que cadre linguistique du droit des contrats. 
Mots clés auteur: Droit des contrats, le droit et l’économie, théorie légale, pensée 
légale.
Mots clés descripteur: Contrats, droit et économie, théorie du droit.
Classification JEL: K, K12, K1.Pablo Márquez-escobar 118
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Summary: Introduction. 1. Realism and Contract Law: A first Distinctive Linguistic 
Pattern. 2. From Realism to Law and Economics. 3. From L & E to CFLS and 
Backwards. Conclusions. Bibliography.
IntroduCtion
Langdell’s first contract law casebook stated: “Law…consists of certain principles 
or doctrines. To have such mastery of these as to be able to apply them with facility 
and certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true 
lawyer”1. Systematization of a set of cases that reveal the principles governing the legal 
system is close to the scientific and deontological pretension and conceptualization 
of Civil Law legal systems. 
However, what has been remarkable about the dynamics of the American Legal 
Thought (ALT) is its close attention to contract law. Certainly during this century 
contract law is almost omnipresent in the ALT cannon. The dynamics of the discussion 
inside the cannon shows, in a first instance, a linguistic denial of contract law. This 
denial was tailored by judicial decisions and the realist revolution, with the use of 
negligence and tort like language to refer to contract law. As in every cycle, the denial 
begets a rebirth, and that is what policy doctrines –asked for– and what the turn to 
economics did by giving a new linguistic framework to contract law. After such 
process, an eclectic, or probably not eclectic but inconspicuous, linguistic of contract 
law was stopped by the Critical Legal Studies (CLS). In fact, the effect of CLS was 
not constructive but de-constructive, undermining the cycle with its purposeless 
and proposeless bi-polar observations, impeding new propositions in contract law 
adjudication and giving an open way to the consolidation of Law and Economics 
(L&E) as the actual linguistic framework of contract law. 
My purpose in this short paper is present the aforementioned dynamic in the Cannon. 
The goal is to describe the tension between the schools and the synthesis that L&E 
brought to ALT, and to show that, although, the CLS is strong in its reasoning, the 
lack of proposition make their statements meaningless for contract law. 
1   C.C, Langdell, Selection of cases on the law of contracts. Preface to the 1st. Edition. (1879)contract law and econoMics: cycles and equilibriuM in cannon of north aMerican legal thought 119
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1. rEaLism and ContraCt Law: a first distinCtivE   
LinguistiC pattErn
1.1. fuLLEr’s rEaCtion in ConsidEration and form
Fuller’s reaction to realist’s appreciation of contract law is clear when he stated: 
“if the development of our society continues along the line it is now following, we 
may expect…that private contract as an instrument of exchange will decrease in 
importance”2. His reaction is not entirely contrary to the ideas of realism, he extracts 
from them several reasons to affirm the terminal ill, but he mainly assures that the 
real problem with contract law and consideration is not that the doctrine of consideration 
should voided but that the legal method must evolve with “reference to the ends it serves”3. 
This is a frontal critic to realists4 but owed a great deal to realism in the manner he 
attacked formalistic enforceability5. 
Studying the importance of the promotion of “private autonomy”, Fuller says that “…
the principle of private autonomy may be translated into terms of the theory of the 
will by saying that this principle merely means that the will of the parties sets their 
legal relations”6. And also states that “the need for investing a particular transaction 
with some legal formality will depend on the extent to which the guaranties that the 
formality would afford are rendered superfluous by forces native to the situation out 
of which the transaction arises”7. So, form was not understood as a way to determine 
legal relations, and therefore, consideration was not a formal structure deduced form 
the law. But, form is a method to achieve legal ends, and therefore, to define policy. 
In this way, Fuller explains how formalities are designed to make the parties think 
about what they are doing.
The linguistic approach used by Fuller to refer to contracts, is just reasoning about form 
and its implications in public policy. Of course, his study and the realist backgrounds 
leads him to find that there are several ways to avoid consideration in contract law and 
then, as an instrument of bargaining, contract law is now understood as an instrument 
of liability thought the concept of reliance8. These statements are not isolated, but are 
a synthesis from the previous opinions of the realists that Fuller, despite criticizing, 
followed in several aspects of their thought. 
2  L, Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Columbia Law Review 799 (1941), at 823, §23.
3  Ibíd., at 824. 
4  Except Cohen who also relies on the positive effects of a new methodology. 
5  L, Fuller, American Legal Realism LXXVI, 191-235, (2 Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 
1936).
6  L, Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Columbia Law Review , supra note 2, at 806. (1941). 
7  Ibíd., at 803.
8  Ibíd., at 823.Pablo Márquez-escobar 120
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1.2. hoLmEs’ path of thE Law and thE rEjECtion of thE CLt
Since Holmes’ Path of the Law, we can find traces of Fuller’s conclusions. Holmes 
notes the dangers of conceptualism in Langdell’s theory of Law and the classical legal 
thought. Conceptualism and abstract application had the pretension of certainty and 
predictability that many civil law countries still have. Holmes shows that certainty in 
such systems is simply and illusion and conceptualism probably was just an apparatus 
to avoid or exclude the new socialist revolution out of the picture9. In fact, Holmes 
states his disagreement with theory of contract saying that “no one will understand 
the true theory…or be able to discuss some fundamental questions intelligently 
until he has understood that all contracts are formal, that the making of a contract, 
depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention, but on the agreement of 
two sets of external signs”10. Further more, “law is more rational and more civilized 
when every rule it contains is referred articulately and definitely to an end which it 
subserves, and when the grounds for desiring that end are stated… in words”11, this 
means, in Holmes words, that the practical importance for the decision of actual cases 
is not concepts but understanding “the reasons of the law”12. 
1.3. from hohfELd, faCts and ConCEpts to CohEn’s tELEoLogy   
of funCtion and poLiCy
On the other hand, Hohfeld displayed the same attack against abstractionism while 
saying, among other statements, that “whether legal or non-legal, chameleon-hued 
words are a peril both to clear thought and to lucid expression”13. In fact, the main 
concern of Hohfeld is conceptualism and the fallacies within; to ask if a party had 
a contract right was meaningless since such concepts were dependent on factual 
relationships14. A right is empty unless the law provides a remedy, a remedy is only 
available if there is a duty to support it. So, only the facts determine if a duty is owed 
and therefore a remedy.15 Cohen, also criticized conceptualism in the Classical Legal 
Thought, rejecting formalism and claiming for a functional approach, saying that 
“functionalism represents an assault upon all dogmas and devices16 that cannot be 
translated into terms of actual experience”17. This seems to explain that concepts are 
9  L, Di Matteo, The contextualist turn. (2002). 
10  O, Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harvard Law Review, 457, at 178. (1897).
11  Ibíd.,at 186.
12  Ibíd., at 198. 
13  W, Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied to Legal Reasoning, 23 Yale Law Journal,  16 , 
at. 29. (1913). 
14  Ibíd., at. 24-25. 
15  Di Matteo, Op., cit at 58-59, (supra note 9, at 24, 2002) 
16  This, again, means conceptualism and form. 
17  F, Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Columbia Law Review, 809, at 822. (1935). contract law and econoMics: cycles and equilibriuM in cannon of north aMerican legal thought 121
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a “function of actual experience”, and not the opposite. Therefore he says that, when 
a realist asks “Is there a contract?” the realist is concerned with the “actual behavior 
of the courts”18 and that is why the “contractual relationship like law in general, is 
a function of legal decisions”19. Llewellyn well understood that law, and especially 
contract law, was inherently attached to concepts and rules20. However, he said that 
“like rules, concepts are not to be eliminated…behavior is too heterogeneous to be 
dealt with except after some artificial ordering”21. But, “a realistic approach to any 
new problem would begin by skepticism as to the adequacy of the received categories 
for ordering the phenomena effectively toward a solution of the new problem”22. 
Thus, substance of contract law is just the remedy, contrary to “typical or the current 
acceptance of a paper rule or statute as meaning something simply because it has 
paper authority”23. 
1.4. haLE’s CoErCion and form, CohEn’s funCtionaLism and 
dEwEy’s phiLosophy of induCtivE rEasoning
Hale followed the same way of reasoning, attacking form and conceptualism, trough 
the concept of coercion, but guided by a different linguistic approach: policy. The 
problem of enforcement is a problem of coercion, and the governmental enforcement 
of freedom of contract is inherently coercive, then, even “the systems advocated 
by professed upholders of the laissez-faire are in reality permeated with coercive 
restrictions on individual freedom”24. Then, contract law is an act of coercion not 
an act of freedom. In fact, as a matter of policy, “the channels into which industry 
shall follow, then, as well as the appointment of the community wealth, depend upon 
the coercive arrangements”25. Therefore, policy and the imposition of duties or coercive 
arrangements –formalities–, is as distributive as normative. That is not necessarily 
bad –according to Hale–, but requires policy analysis, not deductive logic. 
The latter was Dewey’s approach. He defined the philosophical grounds of the realist 
movement, thought the philosophical defense of inductive reasoning and the rise of 
factual analysis, which was one of the gaps in Holmes’ and Hohfeld’s thought. As he 
says, “logic is ultimately an empirical and concrete discipline. Men first employ certain 
ways of investigating and collecting, recording and using data in reaching conclusions, 
18  Ibíd., at 839.
19  Ibíd., at 839.
20  L, Dimatteo, Op. cit., at 57. 
21  K, Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence – The Next Stop, 30 Columbia L. Rev, 431, at 27. (1930).. 
22  Ibíd., at 27.
23  Ibíd., at 11.
24  R, Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Noncoercive State, 38 Political Science Quarterly,  470,   
at 470. (1923). 
25  Ibíd., at 493. Pablo Márquez-escobar 122
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in making decisions”26. Rules according to Dewey should be open and therefore, 
“conceived as tools to be adapted to the conditions in which they are employed rather 
than as absolute and intrinsic principles”27. 
Cohen, also criticized conceptualism in the Classical Legal Thought, rejecting 
formalism and claiming for a functional approach, saying that “functionalism 
represents an assault upon all dogmas and devices28 that cannot be translated into 
terms of actual experience”29. This seems to explain that concepts are a “function of 
actual experience”, and not the opposite. Therefore he says that, when a realist asks 
“is there a contract?” the realist is concerned with the “actual behavior of the courts”30 
and that is why the “contractual relationship like law in general, is a function of legal 
decisions”31. 
1.5. CLosing thE first CyCLE: LLEwELyn’s ruLEs and substanCE
Llewellyn well understood that law, and especially CL, was inherently attached 
to concepts and rules32. However, he said that “like rules, concepts are not to be 
eliminated…behavior is too heterogeneous to be dealt with except after some artificial 
ordering”33. But, “a realistic approach to any new problem would begin by skepticism 
as to the adequacy of the received categories for ordering the phenomena effectively 
toward a solution of the new problem”34. Thus, substance of CL is just the remedy, 
contrary to “typical or the current acceptance of a paper rule or statute as meaning 
something simply because it has paper authority”35. 
2. from rEaLism to Law and EConomiCs
As we can see, realism brought contract law to a different linguistic pattern. A 
contract is not any more a concept is just remedies, this is what the judge looks for in 
a contract. With this approach, the law of contracts lost its scope, applicability and its 
functionality as an institution regulating trade and became a mechanism to regulate 
liability. This is parallel with the judicialization of freedom of contract, consideration 
26  J, Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 Cornell Law Quarterly, 17, at 19. (1924). 
27  Ibíd., at 27. 
28  This, again, means conceptualism and form. 
29  F, Cohen, Op. cit., at 822.  
30  Ibíd., at 839.
31  Ibíd., at 839.
32  L, Dimatteo, at 57. 
33  K, Llwellyn, Op. cit., at 27. 
34  Ibíd., at 27.
35  Ibíd., at 11.contract law and econoMics: cycles and equilibriuM in cannon of north aMerican legal thought 123
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and so on and so forth, where the framework of analysis is negligence, liability and, 
the “concept” stressed by Llewellyn, remedies. Some authors argue that realism was 
not a reactionary but a conservative stage in ALT, realism was the way to preserve 
the traditions of the common law36. 
2.1. fuLLEr on rEaLism: not rEaL Enough
Fuller seems to be conscious about this problem and realizes that the absence of a 
linguistic and a conceptual framework to contract law becomes form its judicialization 
and the judicialization of legal theory. In fact, it is evident that policy is under every 
judicial decision, and as he states, consideration is a problem of substance not a 
problem of form. But, anyway, the path of contract law is its decline as a mechanism 
of bargain as in Fuller’s quotation. The reaction to this new way to understand the 
realist objections and the judicialization of legal theory was founded in the concept 
of policy that Fuller and Cohen had developed a long time ago. What was important 
in Fuller and Hart and Sacks is that they realized that there is a need in legal theory 
to go beyond the judiciary, and recall that the law is not just what the judge says the 
law is. The law goes beyond the judiciary in a set of non-judicial legal relations37. 
2.2. CoasE: propErty, transaCtion Costs and ContraCts
Chronologically, the first step in this rebirth of contract law in the Cannon was given 
by Coase. As there was a linguistic turn in philosophy, this is the economics turn in 
the analysis of legal issues. Indeed, with the use of economic language to explain the 
same phenomena studied in the law, Coase changes the perspective; he understands 
that a legal problems do not start with “trouble”, or, as Holfeld said, “with the duty 
and its remedy”38, but with bargaining39. Contracts, then are not the cause of harm but 
the solution to it40. This view starts with the non-judicial approach to contract law, 
highlighted by Hart and Sacks41, in which the main point is the use transactions costs 
(TC) and property rights, as the principal concept to explain contractual relationships 
and the process of contracting42. 
Coase turns down the judicial analysis of contract law, showing that the solutions to 
such issues are given, ex ante, by contract theory (CT). Indeed, the problem of contract 
36  B, Ackerman, Reconstructing American Law. (1984).
37  H, Melvin., A, Martin., W, Eskridge & P, Fricke., The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Appli-
cation of Law, (Problem No. 1, 1958).
38  Ibid., Supra note 15.
39  R, Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 Journal of Law and Economics, 1, at 4. (1960).
40  Ibíd., at 43.
41  Hart & Sacks, Op. cit., at. 12. 
42  R, Coase, Op cit., 4.Pablo Márquez-escobar 124
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law and Tort Law (TL) comes from a misunderstanding related with the framework of 
analysis both in economics and jurisprudence43. Contract law cannot be a branch 
of the legal system defined ex post by the judiciary, requires Government design and 
therefore, an efficient allocation of property rights and diminution of TC44 by default 
rules, and maximization of the value of production and bargaining45. 
This two ends depart form the assumption that the “the government is, in a sense, 
a super-firm”46 and then, is the director of the policy. In Coase’s view, this policy is 
simply an occasional institutionalized (governmental) plan of allocation of property 
titles and regulation that can lead to a diminution of TC47. Occasional because 
definition of property titles and regulation is costly and not necessary leads to 
better outcomes than the market, but in certain circumstances is less costly for the 
government than for the market to diminish TC via regulation and property rights48. 
So, contract law may be seen as a framework to diminish transaction costs, and 
increase social welfare. 
Transaction costs beget incentives and internalize the costs of action, but with a 
certain default CL, contract negotiation will be as deep as costs allow it. The legal 
issues suggested by Coase, come form the recognition of “market imperfection”, the 
impossibility of perfect solutions, and then, the new linguistic framework, or rhetoric, 
to explain the probable responses of agents to legal intervention49. In Coase’s view, the 
story starts with the definition of the “parable” of the farmer and the rancher, in which 
there is a negative externality. This analysis opens the door to new concepts that help 
interpret the constrains of contractual transactions and contract law, and therefore the 
new ways of legal intervention and judicial policy. In a way, from the tortification 
of contract law, Coase brings a functional approximation to view every problem of 
TL as an ex ante contractual problem. This functional or causal interpretation of the 
facts in economic concepts, leads to a rebirth of contract law as a new set of concepts 
and abstractions in contract law and adjudication. As Fuller, this new perspective 
takes some of the realists, some of the policy and some of the sociology. With the 
construction of a new set of categories, voluntary bargaining, free will and the 
recognition of the transaction limits of contracts, contract law rebirths. 
This Coasean (re)construction of contract theory also is a critic of Classical Legal Thought 
(CLT), the abstract and hard-to-find conceptualizations of mistake, impossibility, 
43  Ibíd., at 4.
44  Ibíd., at 16-19.
45  Ibíd., at 16-19.
46  Ibíd., at 16.
47  Ibíd., at 18.
48  Ibíd.
49  B, Ackerman, Op. cit., at 56. contract law and econoMics: cycles and equilibriuM in cannon of north aMerican legal thought 125
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duress, etc, are not longer the main categories, nor the main issues in contracts 
drafting and litigation. Now, transaction costs, least cost avoider and other economic 
terms appear in the determination of the language to talk about contract law. 
Contract law, after the L&E, is seen as the mechanism to smooth legal commitments, 
coordination and property rights transfers. So contract law is not a mechanism to 
enforce litigation or wrongful actions, but a mechanism to ameliorate conflict. The 
biggest effect of this re-birth of contract law is the changes that such switch has in 
the emphasis of legal thought in non judicial behavior, which, under the judicially-
oriented scholarship, was underemphasized. In addition, L&E became a suitable 
theoretical structure to analyze judicial decisions, as Coase shows50. This is then a 
transactional theory of contract law51, focused not in the judge’s construction but in 
the parties’ intentions; focused not in the remedy but in the clauses. 
2.3. maCuLay and gaLantEr: non-judiCiaL LEgaL rELations and 
powEr within thE judiCiaL systEm
The reaction to the realists’ frame/rhetoric of contract law was not isolated in Coases’ 
words. Macaulay also showed that contracts framed as the judge’s interpretation 
and the judges’ remedies were not the rule but the exception52. In Llewelyn’s words, 
Maculay showed that contracts are a “social event”53. The title of the article shows the 
confusion that realism brought. During the whole article, Maculay showed non-judicial 
enforcement of contracts by contractual practices54, but his mind, apparently, probably 
ironically, calls this contractual terms as non-contractual, presenting contract law as a 
default to litigation. His article is empirical, completely empirical and his conclusions 
go straight to the point: contract law is not the judge rule, but the parties agreement. 
He finds that reputation and other “kind” of incentives induce contractual relations 
and contract law, and then, contract law and bargaining are a part of a transactional 
world not a judicially managed world. 
In Galanter’s article there is also a way to see why contract law and contracts have a 
way to “come out ahead” of the realist not-really-realistic tradition. In fact, he finds 
that litigation by repeated player can influence the outcome of judicial decision; in a 
world where power and “the law” are correlated, evidently, the “haves” in contracts, 
50  R, Coase, Op. cit., at 19-28.
51  E, Rubin, Nonjudicial life of contract law, (Nw.U.L.Rev.). 
52  S, Macaulay, Non Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 American Sociological Review, 
55, (1963). 
53  Ibíd., at
54  Ibíd., at Pablo Márquez-escobar 126
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have an advantage in the outcome of adjudication and redistribution55. His pessimistic 
view of litigation was full of game theory and strategy analysis, but indicated that, 
only with legal change, it would be able to diminish the asymmetries in power and 
distribution mediated by interpretation in favor of the repeated players-haves56. 
3. from L&E to CLs and baCkwards
3.1. kEnnEdy’s moraL bi-poLarism and thE inCommEnsurabiLity 
of ContraCt Law thEory
All the debate about the rhetoric is “(re)interpreted” and “(re)formulated” several 
years later by Duncan Kennedy. His meta-linguistic thesis is interesting, provocative 
and eye-opener, but also, purposeless, proposeless and empty. Kennedy insists that 
the legal system is in a constant tension among two different and incommensurable57 
“visions of the universe” in the law and the moral, making a relationship between 
rules and standards and the morals of self-interest and altruism. In terms of contract 
law, there are some that favor the use of rules and then the interests of self-reliance, 
and those that advocate for standards, are more in favor of the morality of altruism58. 
Then, the debate is a debate about the meaning of morality by itself, which I will call 
bi-polar morality. This bi-polar morality then is, in a positive pole, attracts standards 
to altruism, repealing the negative pole, rules. 
The problem with Kennedy’s bi-polar morality is that he finds that such tension, as 
in a magnet, is not dialectic. When he says: “The opposed rhetorical models lawyers 
use reflect a deeper level of contradiction. At this deeper level, we are divided among 
ourselves, between radically different visions of humanity and society, and between 
radically different visions of our common future”59. This means that such tension 
between the opposite views of the world will not end in a synthesis, but will sustain 
in an irremediable cycle between formalism and altruism. This approach to the law, 
despite of critical and assertive, is useless and hopeless. He is setting “the Law” and 
contract law in a repulsive institutional setting where distribution and altruism is at 
the side of the positive pole, and self-reliance (individualism) and free trade at the 
opposite. 
55  M, Galanter, Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 Law and Society 
Review,  95,  (1974) 
56  Ibíd., at 151.
57  Not in the Kuhn’s way. 
58  Kaplow and Shavell, make an outstanding defense of the altruism in self-reliance morals in Fairness vs. Welfare 
(2004). Also, see Kaplow’s Rules vs. Standards (1994). 
59  D, Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 88 Harvard Law Review1685, at 1685, (1976). contract law and econoMics: cycles and equilibriuM in cannon of north aMerican legal thought 127
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What’s the problem with his view? Well, he is avoiding consequentialism and 
deontology as the guide of the legal system evolution. Indeed, if the law is intended 
to be a social institution to attain development or if the law has a function, from a 
consequentialist point of view, Kennedy’s arguments have no value since he only 
“points” but do not propose. In fact, he asserts that there is no way to balance any of 
those encountered policies since “the imagery of balancing presupposes exactly the 
kind of more abstract unit to measurement that the sense of contradiction excludes”60. 
This point is assertive, since the principle for balancing could be imbibed with the bi-
polar of self-reliance or altruism. However, such distinction is tautologic and useless. 
If the purpose of law is distributive, a way to balance self-reliance and altruism must 
be a way to balance the aim of the law. 
Form a deontologist point of view, Kennedy’s argument is hopeless and empty. He 
says: “The meaning of contradiction at the level of abstraction is that there is no 
meta-system that would, if only we could find it, key us into one mode or the other 
as circumstances ‘required’”61. Then, he does not find the “metaprinciples” that are 
behind the law, nor the principles behind the pervasive counter visions of the world 
that could lead to a deduction of the roots of such conflict. 
Even more pessimistic is his appeal to the impossibility of the existence of a “logic” of 
legal systems as the one stated by Langdell62, highly criticized by Holmes and Dewey. 
It is true that he finds an “order” in adjudication, and such rhetoric of “order”, contract 
law is given in the poles of “policy”, altruism and self-interest or self-reliance63. But, 
again, such rhetorical order of contract law is not related with something different in 
the legal system than judicial and legislative relations; and, as we saw, “the law” and the 
contractual practices within the law go beyond the judicial and legislative process. 
On the other hand, Kennedy finds, not explicitly, a problem of in the linguistics 
of the law, and then creates/follows a meta-approach to legal relations and legal 
analysis of judicial behavior. This meta-language about the law has a simple goal: 
it seems to avoid the functional approach to the law, and helps Kennedy to avoid 
the aforementioned issue about the purpose of a legal system. This kind of Foucaultian 
approach does not refer to the language about the law, and therefore focuses in 
the rhetoric of lawyers and scholars but not in the meaning, purpose and visions 
of the legal system. By doing this he shares only one thing with the L&E tradition, 
that the previous way to “refer” about law was “a chaotic mass of policies”64 that 
60  Ibíd., at 1775.
61  Ibíd., at 1775.
62  Supra note 1.
63  D, Kennedy, Op. cit, at. 1724.
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required a new language or linguistic framework to explain the meaning/scope/
purpose of contractual policies. 
ConCLusions: L&E and thE rEbirth of CL
The main conclusion of L&E is that CL is not a mechanism to enforce litigation 
or wrongful actions, but a mechanism to ameliorate conflict. The biggest effects of 
this re-birth of CL are the changes that such switch has in the emphasis of legal 
thought in non-judicial behavior, which, under the judicially-oriented scholarship, 
was underemphasized. In addition, L&E became steady state theoretical structure to 
analyze judicial decisions, giving “eclecticism” to legal theory since economics can 
be malleable to any side of the bipolar construction of the morals. 
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